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DEFECTION: A MILITARY STRATEGY FOR
WARS OF LIBERATION

Emmett J. O'Brien

Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

6 February 1971

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DEFECTION -
A MILITARY STRATEGY FOR WARS OF LIBERATION

AN INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH REPORT

by

Colonel Emmett J. O'Brien
Military Intelligence

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Emmett J. O'Brien, COL, MI

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The basic questions examined are: first, are the losses through defection indicative of a major weakness of the Communists in wars of liberation; second, does the United States have policy, supporting doctrine and techniques, fixed responsibility and general acceptance of an induced defection strategy? Though defection is not new or foreign to American military strategy, a lack of acceptance exists. Can this lack of acceptance be attributed to the synonymy of desertion and defection? Drawing upon the American Revolutionary War, American Civil War, Philippine Insurgency, Malayan Emergency and Vietnam it was shown that when defection was employed, it normally develops along five functional phases. These phases are known by few, understood by less. It was concluded a void of knowledge about defection exists, in spite of the fact that the US has in the past and continues today to use a defection strategy. The Communists fear defection though they themselves employ it to obtain converts. The proposed correction to this void so as to capitalize on this Communist weakness is the establishment of policy, doctrine; providing a general awareness of the potential defection; and most importantly being prepared to employ defection in potential wars of liberation.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since World War II, over 14 million people have made the decision to flee from the Communist world.¹ In addition, many thousands more involved in Communist-inspired "wars of liberation" whether in the Philippines, Malaya, or South Vietnam have decided to switch rather than fight. One finds many categories of defectors including athletes, dancers, scientists, spies, diplomats, intellectuals, refugees, and military personnel among those who make this incredible decision.

The United States is involved in military and political defections, some by design and some by chance. As of 31 August 1970, an estimated 550,000 Cubans had entered the United States by various means since Communist leader Castro came into power. Of this number, 203,292 arrived via the refugee airlift program paid for by the United States.² The present rate of entry into the United States is about 3,500 per month with no present plans to end or curtail the airlift. At the same time, a very successful United States sponsored Chieu Hoi Program for defections in Vietnam is now in its eighth year with over 160,000 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Regulars changed sides.³ Thus, from both strategic and tactical points of

¹David L. Jones, "Communist Defection: Its Impact on East West Relations," *Military Review*, (March 1966), p. 20.

²"Cuban Refugees," *Parade-The Sunday Newspaper Magazine*, 6 November 1970, p. 2.

³US Military Assistance Command, JARCS, Chieu Hoi Directorate, *Weekly Returner Report for 23-29 August 1970*, p. 1.

view a major imperfection is seen in the armor of communism.

Can this weakness be exploited?

How do the Communists feel about this weakness? Louis Taruc, former Philippine Communist guerrilla, in his autobiography explains the Communist feeling toward this inherent weakness:

Surrender and treason are the two most derogatory words in the revolutionary's vocabulary. To a Communist, they are synonymous. Communists believe that it is much better for a Party Cadre to lose his physical life than give up his political life; and a party functionary who surrenders to the class enemy--the "bourgeoisie" or the capitalist state--warrant the supreme penalty, the forfeiture of both his political and physical life.⁴

SCENARIO

Many are prepared to write a scenario of the future, drawing upon the past and coupling it with forecasting statements from leaders and potential leaders of the world. The past shows that since the end of World War II, armed violence has continued in international politics under the nuclear stalemate as a "complicated and baffling combination of war and revolution, which we are ill equipped to understand by our established ideas as to either."⁵ Since the end of World War II, there have been 119 serious insurgencies, with the Communists involved in 58 of them.⁶ So popular

⁴ Louis Taruc, He Who Rides The Tiger (1967), p. 137.

⁵ Walter Millie, War and Revolution Today (1966), p. 2.

⁶ Jerry M. Tinker, et al., Strategies of Revolutionary Warfare (1969), p. 1

is this "age of insurgency" that a recent book was written on a detailed study of twenty-four insurgencies that have evolved since 1946.⁷

The Communists have warned the free world that "wars of liberation" are in the offing. The most quoted prophet of these wars is Lin Piao, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Vice Premier of Red China, Minister of National Defense of Red China, and considered by most as the heir apparent of Mao. In a paper, regarded by most authorities as establishing Red China's long-range strategy in achieving World Communist domination, Lin Piao states:

Today, the conditions are more favorable than ever before for waging of people's wars by the revolutionary people of Asia, Africa and Latin America against US imperialism and its lackeys. . . . Peoples history has proved and will go on proving that people's war is the most effective weapon against US imperialism and its lackeys.⁸

Even without this promise, a look at the world environment will show that "revolutionary violence is so endemic in the less developed areas that insurgency and internal wars will likely be widespread through the 1970's."⁹ With this depressing future in mind, one must turn to the role the United States will play.

⁷Ward Just, Military Men (1970), p. 111.

⁸US Department of Defense, Armed Forces Information and Education, Red Chinese Blueprint. (1968), p. 21.

⁹Asa P. Jorden, et. al., Issues of National Security in the 1970's (1967), p. 51.

In 1967, Mr. Richard M. Nixon stated:

One of the legacies of Vietnam almost certainly will be a deep reluctance on the part of the United States to become involved once again in a similar intervention on a similar basis . . . if another friendly country would be faced with an externally supported Communist insurrection . . . whether in Asia or in Africa or even Latin America . . . there is serious question whether the American public or the American Congress would support a unilateral American intervention, even at the request of the host government.¹⁰

The evolution of what is now termed the Nixon Doctrine logically follows this pre-election forecast.

American participation, especially the Armed Forces of the United States in this scenario, requires new thinking with innovative ways to participate or accept the objectionable results--a Third World that is Communist. Thus, one should recall the statement made by George Santayana sixty-six years ago in the classic, The Life of Reason: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."¹¹

PURPOSE

Based on the author's personal observations of the Chieu Hoi Program in Vietnam and by historical analysis, it became apparent that a well-functioning defection program was an outstanding strategy against communism and that such a program would have great potential in future "wars of liberation." In Vietnam, the role that the

¹⁰ Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, (October 1967), p. 111.

¹¹ Robert D. Heine, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (1966), p. 148.

American military forces play in the Chieu Hoi Program is actually minimal. The advisory effort to the Vietnamese government was carried on by United States AID personnel, with the bulk of the personnel being "third country" (Philippine) contract personnel. This organization was acceptable in that such a program relied on the "host" country taking an active part, using a limited amount of people and money. As thousands of Viet Cong and NVA military and political personnel (who still had the ability to continue hostile action) entered this program, two observations were obvious: (1) the number of lives saved on both sides and (2) the unimaginable damage done to Communist military and political organizations.¹²

In the opinion of the author, this program did not receive sufficient official or public recognition; it was not glamorous in comparison with other programs implemented during the insurgency. This lack of recognition endangered the potential of the program for present and future application. The author will show that desertion or defection of military or political personnel is not a new phenomenon. The sharp division of political ideology in this bi-polarized world offers new potential to an induced defection strategy.

It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt to study the other way on the two-way street of defection but with the historical aspects of induced defection in mind, perhaps some thoughts can be developed in counteracting the loss. Is a countereffort needed when the youthful American defection population in Canada, Sweden, and elsewhere is considered?

¹² Personal observations of the author.

No effort to examine the exploitable causes for dissatisfaction will be undertaken. It is recognized that the desires of people for national independence, relief from racial oppression, elimination of colonial or foreign exploitation (real or imagined), alleviation of economic destitution, elimination of corruption, and the desire for stabilization and improvement of political and social structure are often the bases for "wars of liberation."

Thus, this paper will concentrate on development of defection as a strategy in some country at some time in the future. In such a country, one can expect to see the division of the people against the legitimate government and endorsing the saving religion of communism. Within a historical framework, the role of the Armed Forces of the United States in induced defection will be examined. It is hoped, if the history of the past is read properly, perhaps a method of destroying the newly preached religion of communism in troubled country "x" is INDUCED DEFECTION.

SCOPE

The romantic side of defection is well reported in the press, especially if the defector is a diplomat, scientist, ranking military leader, or even the daughter of one of the great Communist leaders of the past. This type of defection, better termed international defection, will not be covered in this paper. Research will concentrate on induced defection from communism in a future insurgent situation. It is recognized the potential of defection exists in any level of war. Induced defection is more germane in internal

revolution or Communist-inspired, -directed and -supported revolutions. Defections will be identified as a viable weakness of communism but at the same time as used by the Communists. The reluctance to capitalize on defection will also be explored.

Although defection has played an important role in counter-insurgency in the past two decades, it will be shown that it really is not new or foreign to American military operations. Defection (called desertion) was a program in both the American Revolutionary War and the American Civil War. Because of the nature of the wars, the role defection played in World Wars I and II will not be explored. Using as a basis the Vietnam Chieu Hoi Program, the similarities and differences between the Philippines and Malayan programs will be discussed. Where historical highlights may be gleaned, the American Revolutionary War and Civil War will be drawn upon.

There will be no comprehensive study of the psychological aspects of defection motivation undertaken. An examination of current policies, doctrine, and training on this subject was accomplished with the hope of being able to provide recommendations on how the Armed Forces of the United States can capitalize on a defection strategy. At the same time, existing conditions in a country with a future insurgent problem that causes people to endorse, accept and profess communism which produces "wars of liberation" is also beyond the scope of this paper. A cursory examination of changing Prisoner of War status to that of defector status was accomplished. The study will approach defection from the functional phases of the program rather than by a chronological approach.

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES

It was the author's desire to write an unclassified paper hoping for a wider and more expeditious dissemination. At the same time, it was realized that many important documents (intelligence in nature) are classified thus a heavy reliance on historical information was necessary.

The principal sources for this paper were the

1. US Army War College Library
2. US Army Military Research Collection
3. Foreign Service Institute--Vietnam Training Center.

CHAPTER II

SOME DEFINITIONS

It is safe to say in the terminology of the "cold war" that the gaining power will term the individual a "defector," or some other softer term, while the losing power will call him a "deserter" or "traitor." If the act takes place in a war or warlike condition, he may be called a surrenderee by the gaining force but remains a military or civilian traitor to the loser. The key fact is, the act is the same. The act: he has abandoned a cause, doctrine, or ideology to whom or to which he was bound by some tie.

OFFICIAL DEFINITIONS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) definition of a defector is: "National of a country who has escaped from the control of such a country or who being outside such jurisdiction and control, is unwilling to return thereto and who is of special value to another country."¹ Yet, the standardized and approved definition for NATO among the English speaking nations (Canada, United States, and the United Kingdom) is, "A person who for political or other reasons has repudiated his country and may be in possession of information of sufficient interest to justify special treatment."² To further

¹The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub. 1, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage (1 August 1968), pp. 65-66.

²Ibid., p. 66.

cloud the terminology in NATO the accepted definition of a defector as used among the French speaking nations (Belgium and France) is: "Nonmilitary person of enemy nationality who for political or other nonmilitary reasons has repudiated his country and is in possession of information of sufficient interest to justify special treatment."³ This definition limits defection to nonmilitary personnel. For the purpose of this paper, none of these definitions are acceptable.

PROPOSED DEFINITION

Since this paper will concern itself with defections in "wars of liberation," the proposed definition of a defector is: "Any person who repudiates one of the world's bi-polar ideologies (Communism or Democracy) and professes an allegiance to, and assistance to the protecting country's ideology." This proposed definition recognizes the right of military or civilian personnel to defect; requires the rejection of the opposing ideology; a requirement for allegiance removing the "French Leave" and attic dwellers from the category of defectors; requires giving assistance to the gaining power; and recognizes the "two way" street of defection.

In this paper, the words defector and deserter will be used throughout. The author understands the obnoxious terms of deserter, traitor, and their connotations but the act makes them identical. This is not a new problem. In the American Civil War the Confederate soldiers who deserted and joined the Union military forces were

³Ibid.

called "Galvanized Yankees." In the Philippines, the program was called EDCOR (an acronym for Economic Development Corps) and in Malaya the British called the defectors SEPS (Surrendered Enemy Personnel). In Vietnam, the program is called Chieu Hoi (return to a just cause) and those entering (defecting) are called Hoi Chanh (returnee). It becomes obvious that any term is acceptable as long as it does not specify the exact offensive act. Though the "cold war" has led us to accept the term defector, the former Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency even took exception to the use of the term "defector" at a time when international defection was at its watershed. He stated defection was "a term that is resented, and properly so, by the persons who come to freedom from tyranny."⁴

⁴Allen W. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (1963), p. 29.

CHAPTER III

THE PRISONER OF WAR PROBLEM

Can an individual who has been taken as a prisoner of war (POW) change his status to that of a defector? The complexity of the answer to this question is beyond the limits of this paper. It is essential in an examination of defection to consider the common practice of inducing defection among POWs. It should be noted that one school of thought on this subject feels that a prisoner of war cannot give up his rights, even the right to be a prisoner of war. It becomes even more complex in the insurgent situation because often the defector is a national. Though legal confusion exists, it is generally thought "the national tie would in such cases be an obstacle to international legislation, and the captive prisoner of war status would be overruled by their capacity as nationals."¹

Historically, defectors have been induced from prisoner of war cages in the American Revolutionary War, the American Civil War, the Malay Emergency, and, even more recently, Vietnam. In 1969, 313 POWs petitioned the government of South Vietnam to allow them to defect.² The advantages of this approach are twofold: life as a free citizen (true defector status) is far better for the individual

¹Rene-Jean Wilhelm, Can the Status of Prisoners of War Be Altered? (1953), p. 31.

²JUSPAO, Vietnam Feature Service, Changing Allegiance, The Chieu Hoi Program in Vietnam, TCB-072 (1970), p. 21. (Hereafter referred to as "JUSPAO, The Chieu Hoi Program in Vietnam").

than the best POW treatment, and more importantly the usability of the previously nonproductive POW manpower strengthens the government.

It is recognized that American heritage provides nothing but contempt for those who change sides; these depicable traitors most recently have been called "turncoats." It is the opinion of the author that defection from the POW status is a fact that must be accepted as it has in the past, and that it will probably continue to exist and will become even more prominent and perhaps even the norm in insurgent situations.

CHAPTER IV

A NORMAL ADVERSION

DESERTION VERSUS DEFECTION

The word desertion causes a mental block in the minds of most people, especially those associated with the military. This resulted in the use of the term defection at the time of the start of the "cold war." Defection does not have the shameful ring of desertion, yet the act is the same.

DESERTION IN A HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

Writers of military history avoid remarks, other than in passing, about desertion, or if an explanation is required take a most apologetic approach. One highly respected Civil War historian in addressing the subject stated: "The term deserter is one of reproach and disgrace on the lips of everyone and the average layman learns with surprise and some doubt that the penalty for desertion is not always death without alternatives."¹

In the Preface, the same author stated:

Knowledge of any desertion in the brave ranks of the armies engaged in the Civil War . . . will come as a distinct shock; even by the historical scholar the full extent of the evil, the wide distribution through all ranks and all parts of the country, the early and continuous manifestation of disaffection and enormous numbers implicated on both sides may not be fully grasped.²

¹Ella Lonn, Desertion During the Civil War (1928), p. 226.

²Ibid., Preface.

Some writers may provide a qualification to the apology such as: "Or this study (Desertion of Alabama Troops from the Confederate Army) presents a phase of war which cannot be glorified though it has its heroic aspects, and emphasizes a topic of military history which has been generally ignored."³ This topic, though ignored by Civil War historians, was a very real problem at the time. History contains passing statements that confederate leaders considered desertion the chief cause of many serious military defeats. In 1862, General Lee reported to the War department that desertion was the cause of his retreat from Maryland.⁴ Press reports of 1863 suggest that desertion was the cause of the surrender of Vicksburg and the failure at Gettysburg.⁵

Since desertion or defection has always existed, and since empirical data indicate that it is a quantum weakness in communism as it was for the leaders of the American Civil War, perhaps it should be examined from a less passionate point of view. There are those who say that defection is an oriental characteristic, which is the mere acceptance of the adage in Eastern Culture of the fact that the grass which bends with the prevailing wind is more to be admired than the oak which stands unyielding. It is strange, though, when one looks at World War II and finds large-scale surrender of Soviet forces to the Germans. In the first nine months of the campaign in European Russia, an estimated three and one-half million

³Jessie Martin, Desertions of Alabama Troops from the Confederate Army (1932), p. 255.

⁴Ibid., p. 256.

⁵Ibid.

Red Army soldiers voluntarily surrendered.⁶ A study of the Kaminsky Brigade and the Vlasov Movement reenforces the universality of defection.

DEFECTION - A NONPROFESSIONAL ATTRIBUTE

Another disclaimer against defection is that this is an attribute of the nonprofessional soldier under poor leadership. However, a study of early American history shows that even respected and well-led Hessian troops had a change of heart. One of the earliest records shows the American use of induced defection against General Riedesel's troops at Boston:

Every effort to persuade the troops to desert, especially those who were skilled laborers. . . . American recruiting officers brought music, liquor and even women to the camps of the prisoners in order to secure enlistments in the revolutionary army.⁷

This program was effective for at the end of the Revolutionary War a resolution was passed in Congress to help the Hessian soldiers. They were invited to stay in America and become citizens. As a result, 7,000 Germans did not return home but settled in the United States.⁸ The professionals in the Civil War were no exception; during 1865, 45 out of every 100 Regular Army members on the Union side deserted.⁹

⁶David L. Jones, p. 20.

⁷Mathew H. Volm, The Hessian Prisoners in the American War of Independence and Their Life in Captivity (1937), p. 11.

⁸Ibid., p. 15.

⁹Robert C. Humber, Absences and Desertions During First World War (1943), p. 6.

NO-QUARTER-GIVEN APPROACH

"Defectors are 'traitors' and can only be considered with contempt." This statement was heard by the author many times in Vietnam. In the early days of Diem and his brother, the only proper treatment that insurgents received was "extermination." With this in mind, when the defection program was started, it was called "Chieu Hoi," translated as "return to a just cause." This was because the Diems would not embrace the principle of amnesty, nor would they accept any name for a program that implied forgiveness, exoneration, or amnesty.¹⁰ It should be noted that Chieu Hoi evolved into an amnesty program by those who administered it and only after the violent departure of the Diem brothers was the program broadened.

OUTLOOK

It can be seen that desertion or defection is not reserved for certain ethnic groups limitedly trained or led combat units, a particular geographical area, or any particular war. Historically, it has been a problem or a blessing, and only now with the hard dividing lines being drawn between Democratic and Communist ideologies does it come into sharper focus. It will continue to exist as one Civil War historian observed: "Still human nature continues in the flesh weak and faculty and desertion has not yet vanished from the face of the globe; probably it will become obsolete only when wars have ceased to exist."¹¹

¹⁰ Douglas Pike, War, Peace and the Viet Cong (1969), p. 102.

¹¹ Lonn, p. 226.

CHAPTER V

FUNCTIONAL PHASES OF INDUCED DEFECTION

When in the past the decision was made to employ defection as a military strategy, it is noted that certain common phases historically evolved. Using the American Revolutionary War, the American Civil War, the Philippine Huk Insurgency, the Malayan Emergency, and most recently Vietnam, it can be shown that each program had five phases. The concentration or energy expended in each phase varied. The author elected to study the phases of defection rather than to examine individual wars or insurgencies. Vietnam is drawn on very heavily because of the personal knowledge of the author in this ongoing defection effort. These five functional phases are:

Inducement.

Reception and Interrogation.

Training.

Resettlement and Employment.

Followup.

INDUCEMENT

The first functional phase has two major subdivisions; the PROMISE and communicating the PROMISE. These two elements are not independent of each other, and support and honesty applied to both is essential. Historically, communicating the promise has received far more emphasis.

THE PROMISE

For a man or woman to defect it is necessary that something be promised in exchange for changing sides. Since the individual to whom the program is directed is in fact resisting the government either in a military or political manner, he must be given some form of amnesty. Some tangible reward is also important since most people will agree that a defector is more pragmatist than not. Our Revolutionary forefathers, in their effort to induce defection of the Hessian, promised those joining the Continental Army a higher rank and assignment to a Corps composed exclusively of Germans.¹ The Union Army in the Civil War promised Confederate deserters pay for their equipment and immunity from enforced military service against their former compatriots.² The South promptly retaliated with General Order Number 64 promising to assist prospective deserters in their journey back to their northern homes.³ In the Philippine Insurgency an initial General Amnesty Order issued in June of 1948 failed.⁴ It was not until Magasaysay asked the question:

Why do you fight? For land of your own? Well, then you can quit fighting because I'll give you land. You can have a house in a village with electricity, a school, fifteen acres and caraboa (water buffalo). The government will give it to you. . . . I promise.⁵

¹ US Department of Army, DA Pamphlet 20-213: History of Prisoner of War Utilization by US Army 1776-1945 (1 June 1955), p. 14. (hereafter referred to as "DA Pamphlet 20-213").

² Loon, p. 228.

³ Ibid., p. 229.

⁴ Jesus M. Vargas, Communism in Decline: The Huk Campaign (1966), p. 5.

⁵ William Warden, "Robin Hood of the Islands," The Saturday Evening Post, (12 January 1952), p. 26.

This defection program in the Philippines is often referred to as the Economic Development Program (EDCOR). Actually EDCOR's role in the insurgency was far greater than just defection.

The "I Promise" area was the fertile underpopulated island of Mindanao.⁶

The British promise in Malaya was somewhat different and best explained on the back of a multilanguage safe-conduct pass. In English, Malay, Tamil, and Chinese the terms were:

- (1) Those of you who genuinely desire to give up the armed struggle may come out of the jungle and may ask any individual to help you to do this.
- (2) You must bring your arms with you or be prepared to state where they are so that they can be recovered by the government.
- (3) You will NOT be prosecuted for any offense connected with the emergency which you have committed under Communist direction before this date.
- (4) Those who show that they genuinely intend to be loyal to the elected government of Malaya and to give up their Communist activities will be helped to regain their normal life and to be reunited with their families, if they so wish.
- (5) As regards the remainder, they will be repatriated to China (with their families, if they so wish) and will not be made the subject of any investigation but will be given fair treatment while awaiting repatriation.

Only a few defectors selected repatriation to China and as one author pointed out, "one wonders how those who did were treated when

⁶Franklin Mark Osanka, Modern Guerrilla Warfare (1967), p. 182.

⁷Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War (1966), pp. 104-105.

they got there."⁸ It should be noted that in all defection programs the weapons that are brought in by the defector are most important.

In Vietnam, the Chieu Hoi Program progressed much further than any program because it not only brought the defectors back into society, but also sought to bring them back into the political decision arena as well. Some felt this mechanism might well have the intrinsic possibilities of ending the war along Malayan Emergency lines.⁹ The Doan Ket or National Reconciliation Program was initiated in April of 1967, four years after the initial start of the Chieu Hoi Program; the program provided:

(1) All those who decide to leave the ranks of the Communists and reintegrate in the national community will be warmly welcomed as citizens with full rights of citizenship. All returnees will be protected by the government, which will also provide them facilities to build a new life. In other words, every citizen who abandons the Communist ranks will enjoy the rights set forth in the Constitution, including the right to have the law protect his freedom, his life, his property, and his honor, the right to vote and to run for office, the right to go back and live with his family, the right to choose his place of residence and the right to enjoy the national assistance in the pursuit of his profession.

(2) The citizens who rally to the national cause will be employed in accordance with their ability so that every Vietnamese, without distinction, will have the opportunity to contribute positively to the reconstruction and development of the country.

⁸Ibid., p. 103.

⁹Douglas Pike, War, Peace and the Viet Cong (1969), p. 102.

(3) The citizens who rally to the national cause but who have violated the law under Communist coercion or deception, whether they have been convicted or not, will enjoy all the guarantees set forth in the Constitution. The country will be tolerant to the utmost so they have the opportunity to put their ability and determination to serve and redeem themselves.¹⁰

These promises provided the maximum reacceptance an insurgent could hope to gain.

However, often the pragmatic aspects remained as important in the promise. In Vietnam these pragmatic promises were:

- (1) Payment of weapons rewards, for weapons brought in, or a cache that the defector leads military forces to.
- (2) Payment for inducing other Viet Cong or NVA to defect.
- (3) A government grant of 2,000 piasters (about \$16) for clothing, and 300 piasters a month spending money during the orientation period, as well as 50 piasters a day for food.
- (4) A departure gift of 1,290 piasters when the defector leaves the reception center.
- (5) A six-month draft deferment commencing at the end of the orientation period.¹¹

The question arose what would be accomplished by a government in an insurgent situation that makes promises to active insurgents? The accomplishment, or better the advantage, of a defection promise falls into two categories: first, humanitarian and second, pragmatic.

From the humanitarian point of view, when a government involved in an insurgency provides the enemy soldier, guerrilla, or political cadre an alternative to that of being destroyed or forced to lead an unacceptable life, then this clearly demonstrates a "just" government.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 103-104.

¹¹ JUSPAO, The Chieu Ho Program in Vietnam, pp. 7-10.

This places the opposing ideology in a much different light. This is reenforced with the obvious critical fact that defection saves human lives on both sides. It is hoped that the goal of the insurgent is to live in his native land under a government that permits him to prosper. Continued destruction caused by war leaves little hope for this goal. Defection provides a chance "for another day."

On the pragmatic side, the advantage is that defection weakens enemy morale by forcing the enemy to spy on his personnel in an effort to slow the tide of defection. In Vietnam, the Communist counterdefection program consists not only of many words but action, such as dividing units into three-man teams, each of whose members is to watch for defection in his two comrades. The author has knowledge of cases where questionable units were required to sleep without their clothes, and in extreme cases, weapons of all unit members were held by a trusted few. In addition, the Communist restricted their movement, establishing elaborate pass systems for those whose duties required them to leave the base area.¹² Under these counterdefection conditions, defections occur and with defection comes needed intelligence. This pragmatic effect of a defection program will be covered in detail later. The last and in many countries the most important advantage of defection as a strategy, is the strengthening of the country from a military, social, and economic point of view by the infusion of the critical resource of previously unavailable manpower with its skills.

¹²R. G. Jones, p. 7.

COMMUNICATING THE PROMISE

Once the promise has been made, it must be communicated to the potential defector. As stated previously, the Revolutionary War approach--the person to person appeal--used recruiters offering bribes of liquor, women, and music. In the Civil War, the "amnesty" was announced by general orders on both sides; these were reported in the presses of both the North and the South. One author explaining the high defection rate in the American Civil War placed the blame on "the cowardly or traitorous encouragement of desertion by civilians from which the Union and Confederate forces suffered."¹³ In the Philippine Insurgency, the Army played a major role by establishing of the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), a major change from the previous Army role. It is interesting to note that the United States Information Service used mobile movies and held open discussion in spreading the promise.¹⁴ In a personal interview, Ramon Magsaysay said: "We appealed to the Huks by radio, by dropping messages, by talking to Huk women and children."¹⁵ Communicating the promise in Malaya was active; an official report stated:

Everything possible was done to encourage terrorists to surrender. Leaflets were dropped, talks and broadcasts were given by exterrorists, surrender appeals were made through loudspeakers fitted to aircraft and drama troupes tour the villages performing simple anti-Communist plays to the illiterate rural population to counteract similar dramas used by the Communists to spread their doctrine.¹⁶

¹³ Lonn, p. 136.

¹⁴ Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (1955), p. 128.

¹⁵ Warden, p. 26.

¹⁶ Reference Division, Central Officer of Information, United Kingdom, The Fight Against Communism in Malaya (1953), p. 3.

In Malaya, the printed word on the leaflet drew a normal Communist Party response, in that it became a capital offense even to pick up a government surrender leaflet. One writer reported the "Communist leaders were well aware that surrender was the most devastating disease that could strike their Army."¹⁷

In Vietnam, in all probability, the most intensive and extensive psychological campaign ever conducted was used by both the United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) with its field extensions and efforts of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (US Army) with a battalion located in each corps provided the United States support.¹⁸ The ubiquitous "safe conduct pass," a multilingual (Vietnamese-Korean-Thai-English) leaflet, literally blanketed South Vietnam. This leaflet was supported by intensive use of fixed and flying loudspeakers, the latter being mounted on aircraft. One of the most effective methods to communicate the promise was by direct contact. This direct contact took the form of other defectors moving as a paramilitary unit into questionable areas. Use of defectors in an Armed Propaganda Team role will be discussed in more detail later.

A quantitative look at psychological operations in Vietnam for one month is worthy of note. In a typical month (March 1969), the defection message was disseminated throughout Viet Cong-controlled or contested areas by 713.4 million leaflets dropped from planes and

¹⁷Clutterbuck, p. 106.

¹⁸US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, CORDS, Chieu Hoi Directorate, Fact Sheet - Chieu Hoi Program (1969), p. 1. (hereafter referred to as "Fact Sheet - Chieu Hoi Program").

3.3 million distributed by hand (many by previous defectors); six million copies of newspapers were air-dropped and 7.5 million distributed by hand; 156,000 posters supporting defection; and 2,142 hours of radio, television, and motion picture messages coupled with 8,735 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts. In addition, 12,222 tete-a-tete contacts were made with audiences, including previously unsurfaced enemy or relatives and friends of men still in the Communist ranks. These contacts were made by information service teams, medical teams, armed propaganda teams, and culture-drama teams--last being an excellent utilization of women defectors.¹⁹

Communist reaction to such saturation could well be a study in itself. To counteract the light aircraft equipped with loudspeakers, the Communists attempted to drown out the defection message by ordering whole villages into the streets to beat wildly on pots and pans whenever the aircraft came over.²⁰ It was also common knowledge that after a leaflet drop, a "cleanup campaign" would be conducted by the Communist leaders, who carefully destroyed all safe conduct passes. The ingenuity of where to hide safe conduct passes on one's body should well provoke thought. The real testimony as to how effectively the promise was communicated was the undeniable fact that by August 1970, 162,409 believed the message and entered the defection program.²¹ The loss of 104,000 defectors by the Confederate Army out of its 1,082,000-man force is offered as a comparison.²²

¹⁹JUSPAO, The Chieu Hoi Program in Vietnam, pp. 5-6.

²⁰"With Open Arms," Time, 27 March 1967, p. 52.

²¹US Military Assistance Command Vietnam, CORDS, Chieu Hoi Directorate, Weekly Returned Report for 23-29 August 1970, p. 1.

²²Lonn, pp. 226-231.

CHAPTER VI

RECEPTION AND INTERROGATION

When the promise has been made and communicated, the potential defector must then make a decision. The decision requires him or her to move to a safe location on the opposing side. In the American Civil War, the Union placed the defectors on parole after an oath of allegiance was given.¹ The Confederates held deserters as POWs, thus facilitating passage through the Confederacy to the federal lines. In addition, foreign defectors were shipped to their homelands.² In the case of the Huks, Ramon Magsaysay was the reception committee: "He talked to them, man to man. They became his friends."³ Some were housed in prison; others in the Philippines were moved to the EDCOR development in Mindanao.⁴ In Malaya, the program was developed along police system lines, and individuals were maintained initially by the police. Some lived in police compounds and received salaries commensurate with the lowest ranks in the force.⁵

Since this initial reception is a defector's first time to see if the promise that has been communicated is true, and at the same time the first opportunity to show that he or she is in fact an honest defector, physical conditions at the reception center are important.

¹Lonn, p. 229.

²Ibid.

³Carlos R. Romulo, Crusade in Asia Philippine Victory (1955), p. 136.

⁴William O. Douglas, "Asia, 1952," Lonn, (4 November 1952), p. 25.

⁵Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (1956), p. 118.

In Vietnam, administrative aspects of the reception are more elaborate. Administration of the program is the responsibility of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi, which has a national center in Saigon; four regional centers located in Danang, Binh Dinh, Bien Hoa, and Cantho; and forty-four provincial centers and three autonomous city centers located in Danang, Camranh, and Vung Tau.⁶ In addition, district centers are under development, these district centers are small temporary holding areas for defectors until they can be moved to a provincial or the national Chieu Hoi Center.

About 70% of all defectors rally to civilian government agencies (Police-Chieu Hoi facilities); those who remain rally to military forces.⁷ This ratio is most interesting and needs further exploring along two premises: first, people don't defect only in the heat of battle and second, battlefield defectors should be treated as prisoners of war. Many defectors in Vietnam during debriefing indicated that they had planned to defect as much as six months before the date they actually came in.⁸ It was no different in Malaya--one author explained the high spirits of the defector when he arrived in the safety of the police: "After his months of agony and indecision, culminating in the tension of taking the plunge, the surrendered guerrilla's relief at being in the police station exploded into a wave of intensely high spirits."⁹ It is the author's opinion that the most negating thing against the defection program in Vietnam was the general belief in the

⁶ Fact Sheet - Chieu Hoi Program, p. 1.

⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

⁸ R. G. Jones, p. 9.

⁹ Clutterbuck, p. 107.

second premise by United States and other Free World forces. A statistical analysis of units will bear this out; however, it is beyond the security classification of this paper.

After arrival at the initial defection facility, it is most important that interrogation be initiated as soon as possible. The term, interrogation, is harsh and as the term deserter has been softened, so should interrogation be termed "interview." The interview should be designed to produce initial perishable intelligence and, at the same time, provide the answer to the question: Is the defector bonafide or a questionable or potential infiltrator? The quality of the defector, and his or her potential for possessing information generally provides the best guidelines to determine the length and detail in initial and subsequent interviews. Many times sheer numbers and cyclic arrival of defectors often reduce initial interviews to a mere screening. This gross screening is most unfortunate. It must be realized that not all defectors are senior military or political leaders or people with extensive tactical or strategic information; many are low level. In Malaya, a low-level defector was termed a "squaddie."¹⁰ In Vietnam, the term "rag pickers" was applied by American intelligence personnel.

In Vietnam, following the initial interview the defectors are sorted. Middle-level defectors are sent to Regional Chieu Hoi Centers and all high-ranking Viet Cong and all NVA are transferred to the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon. During their stay in the

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 109.

respective center, intelligence exploitation continues by all interested military and civilian agencies; at the same time, the National Police have the responsibility of verifying the curriculum vitae and origin of the defector. The National Police of Vietnam have detailed to each Regional and Provincial Chieu Hoi Centers at least two policemen, and a larger, more experienced police group conducts interviews at the National Center in Saigon. If at any time during these interviews it is determined that the defector has knowledge of weapon or supply caches, he may be borrowed to assist tactical operations. The essential fact is that he must volunteer for such operations.

The reason why he volunteers is interesting; generally, it is for the hope of gaining financial reward and to prove he is a bonafide defector. The British in Malaya, as well as other involved in Vietnam, were amazed with the "mentality of the defector." The strange, often repeated pattern was best described by one British author: "Within minutes of giving himself up, he was quite prepared to lead security force patrols to his recent hideout and watch calmly while they (police) attacked and killed his erstwhile comrades."¹¹ This destruction of former loyalty was repeated many times in Vietnam. An unclassified example was the NVA sergeant squad leader who defected on 2 November 1967 in Kontum Province. He gave precise information concerning an enemy attack at Dak To, including complete enemy plans,

¹¹T. N. Green, et. al., The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him (1962), p. 125.

strengths, and location. The US 4th Infantry Division dispersed its forces in an optimum manner and defeated the Communist unit.¹²

The major difficulty in exploiting intelligence gained from defectors, in the opinion of the author, is the hesistancy for units to use such intelligence. Hours of interrogation were expended in POW cages with the result the often normal restrained POW answer-- name, rank, and place of birth; this was not the case with defectors. Another major weakness of intelligence in using the defector was the role he could play in the destruction of the infrastructure.

¹²The Rand Corporation, Chieu Hoi Program - 1967 Year End Report (1968), p. 1. (18)

CHAPTER VII

TRAINING

THE PROFILE OF THE INSURGENT

The insurgent profile is most difficult to establish and, based on an examination of Philippine, Malayan, and Vietnam insurgencies, it is safe to say that there is no single true pattern for what makes an insurgent. One author in a review of twenty-four insurgent situations reported: "The lack of necessary skills for earning a living in modern society often contributes to a man's decision to join an insurgency."¹ In contrast, in Malaya it was found that the education of the Communist guerrilla was generally above average."² In the Philippines the Huks were young, generally not married. In Vietnam, we found that both the husband and wife, and often the children, supported the insurgent. This was complicated by determination of the role played by political idealism. The profile is not clear, but the best answer for a government employing induced defection lies in education and training.

NECESSITY FOR TRAINING

The Vietnam defection program provided three types of training:

- (1) Political Training
- (2) Vocational Training
- (3) Literacy Training

¹Jerry M. Tinker, et. al., Strategies of Revolutionary Warfare (1969), p. 334.

²Clutterbuck, p. 103.

The degree, intensity, and duration of these programs is a virgin area that needs considerable study, which unfortunately has not been done. Defectors in great numbers, which can be expected in insurgent situations, can play a major role in the future "nation-building" or they can be an albatross for the nation to wear.

POLITICAL TRAINING

The defector from a Communist insurgency has been receiving some level of political training before Communist recruitment as well as throughout his stay with the insurgents. In Vietnam, the decision was made not to employ the Communist system of brainwashing, but a low key system of really explaining the present government position. The accomplishment of such an approach is yet to be measured, but as we shall discuss later, very few have rejected defection and returned to Communist control. Political training was conducted, based on the level of responsibility of the defector. From the Provincial, to the Regional, to the National Centers, each was conducted with a different intensity. This separation for political training was the same separation as discussed previously for interrogation. The use of earlier defectors as political instructors in the program played an important role. The often overlooked fact was the example and the conditions that the defector found that really accomplished this political transaction.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING

A defection program that provided new skills gained two ways for the nation: first, by providing financial security for the defector,

thus assuring that he would not rejoin the insurgent; second, it served as an inducement for others to defect in the hope they might enjoy the same benefits.³ In Vietnam, vocational training was given in barbering, tailoring, woodworking, auto driving, auto repair and cinvaran block making. Like all training or education, the effectiveness of these programs really rested on the ability of those in charge. The author observed both extremes in the Vietnam program. The role of the national armed forces, undergoing an insurgency, in contributing to such a program, has great potential. Unfortunately, in Vietnam neither Free World nor Vietnamese armed forces participate.

LITERACY

In the "Third World," the literacy rate is a shameful fact of life. Thus, any effort to overcome this trouble-causing weakness is essential. About 65% of Vietnamese defectors were farmers before their service in the Viet Cong, 20% were laborers and 10% were small traders.⁴ About one fourth had no formal education at all, and a bare handful reached college.⁵ Observers at literacy classes in Vietnam were always surprised to see defectors undergoing literacy training. The false opinion held by many was that the insurgent was a politically motivated individual. In such classes, individuals who were unable to read and write their own language a short time before had the total mission to destroy the government that was now teaching them. Only

³Tinker, p. 334.

⁴JUSPAO, The Chieu Hoi Program in Vietnam, pp. 16-17.

⁵Ibid.

one conclusion could be drawn; the only opinions the defectors could have developed would be those based on the spoken word, and in their case the spoken word was the word of communism. Unfortunately, this Communist "spoken word" has continued in many places even at this very moment.

CHAPTER VIII

RESETTLEMENT

The real challenge to any defection program and to the government that uses it is the resettlement phase. The goal of such a program should be to accommodate the defector into the "national mainstream of life." Conflict arises in this: should the individual return to his home, go to a new locality or settle in villages or areas composed of only defectors? No single alternative is correct in all cases. The resettlement problem is further complicated by the fact that in an active insurgent condition most "defectors" are draft-eligible.

HISTORICAL RESETTLEMENT

The military obligation will be addressed first. In the American Revolutionary War, we find that Count Casimir Pulaski commanded a corps comprised of approximately 400 German deserters.¹ The mixing of deserters with other troops was of some concern, in that a Congressional committee condemned the practice of enlistment of ex-enemy forces as being "impolitic."² George Washington objected to the policy at the time; he felt that the recruiting of disaffected men, prisoners of war, and enemy deserters was a contributing factor of

¹DA Pamphlet 20-213, p. 14.

²Ibid.

some importance in the desertion of American troops, since such recruits (defectors) demoralized the American soldiers who deserted upon the least excuse.³

In the Civil War, a similar approach was followed, over 6,000 Confederate soldiers who defected were formed into military units by the North and sent west to fight Indians. These six regiments not only fought Indians, but were used to guard the Union Pacific Railroad survey parties, escort supply trains to Oregon, rebuild telegraph lines, man isolated outposts, and even protect stagecoaches.⁴ They were called "Galvanized Yankees."

In the Philippines, Magsaysay used them as a defector commando force who had at one time invaded the mountain sanctuary of Huk Command Number 5 on the Island of Panay with excellent results.⁵

In Malaya, a special force composed of 180 defectors was used against guerrillas.⁶ Those who did not join the Special Operational Volunteer Force that operated along with the Police Field Forces worked for Special Branch of the Police; others were assigned to the Department of Information to assist in carrying out propaganda work.⁷

In the Philippines, not all defectors were immediately given land. Some were given sentences, while undergoing the sentences they were

³Ibid.

⁴D. Alexander Brown, The Galvanized Yankees (1963), p. 2.

⁵Romulo, p. 136.

⁶Lennox A. Mills, Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal (1958), p. 64.

⁷Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (1956), p. 118.

given vocational training. In addition, Magsaysay secured a small appropriation from Congress from which loans to start small businesses could be secured.⁸

THE VIETNAM SOLUTION

In Vietnam, the resettlement problem was different from that experienced in other insurgencies because of the number of people involved (over 160,000) and the fact that an active insurgency continued with the presence of an invading Army (NVA). The sheer numbers plus the warlike conditions further complicated resettlement because a shortage of qualified governmental personnel existed. There was a hesitancy on the part of private citizens and governmental officials to accept the defector back into the mainstream of life.

With the continued need for military and paramilitary forces, the defector of draft age was called upon to fulfill his military obligation. The defector in Vietnam was given a six-month draft deferment after leaving the orientation phase of reception. Most were tired of fighting and were happy to take advantage of this promise, but often they found their return to civilian life difficult because an ex-Viet Cong could be a most unpopular person in a village. If for no other reason, the defector was unwelcome simply because the people were afraid that trouble would follow him.⁹ In 1968, 11 of the 21 Chieu Hoi hamlets were attacked by the Communists.¹⁰

⁸William O. Douglas, "Asia, 1952," Look, 4 November 1952, p. 31.

⁹JUSPAO, Tha Chieu Hoi Program in Vietnam, p. 9.

¹⁰Fact Sheet - Chieu Hoi Program, p. 5.

It is not surprising to find that over 20% of the defectors elected to join some form of military service before their deferments were up.¹¹ Like all draft-age citizens, by volunteering they gained the right to choose their branch of service. Many with families selected the militia units, so that they could be stationed near home, in preference to the better paid ARVN units that could be sent anywhere in the country. Two paramilitary units were composed of defectors--the Kit Carson scout and the Armed Propaganda Teams. As of 22 December 1969, there were 2,183 Kit Carson scouts serving with the United States Army and Navy units, as well as with Thai and Australian forces.¹² Their contribution in the Vietnam struggle demonstrated one of the highlights of the defection program. Since the spring of 1966 when first established to June 1969, over 150 Kit Carson scouts had been killed in action and 472 wounded.¹³ The examples of scouts giving their lives to save Americans and Americans giving their lives to save the scouts are plentiful in the recorded history of the Vietnam struggle.

The other paramilitary utilization of defectors was the Armed Propaganda Teams (APTs), a large force composed of 4,150 men and women whose real mission was to support the defection program.¹⁴ Direct contact was considered one of the most effective methods of inducing defection. Thus the mission of the APTs was:

¹¹ JUSPAO, The Chieu Hoi Program in Vietnam, p. 5.

¹² MACCORD-CHD, Subject: Kit Carson Scout Summary of Activities (12 December 1969), p. 1.

¹³ Fact Sheet - Chieu Hoi Program, p. 4.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 1.

(1) Disseminate defection policy among the population, concentrating on countering the enemy propaganda arguments.

(2) Contacting and inducing enemy personnel to defect.

(3) Participating in military operations for psyops inducement purposes and assisting local security forces in the discovery of enemy caches.

(4) Providing security for Chieu Hoi facilities and hamlets.¹⁵

This force had a very limited fighting capability, since they were armed with M-1 carbines which were provided basically for self defense. In spite of some criticism, it is the author's opinion that when and if the history of this paramilitary force is written it will show accomplishments, bravery, valor and mission success.

ISOLATION

The policy in Vietnam had been that whenever 100 defector families were located in a province and these families experienced difficulty in finding a place to live, a defector hamlet was built. As of June 1969, there were 21 such hamlets in Vietnam with six more under construction.¹⁶ These hamlets were often the target of enemy attacks. Eleven of the 21 were attacked in 1968.¹⁷ The security of these hamlets was the responsibility of the Armed Propaganda Teams. The goal for each of these hamlets was to have a free election and be given a

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 1-2.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁷Ibid.

name and thus become a normal hamlet. Though filled with intrinsic pitfalls and obviously the least desirable method of resettlement, it was often very necessary.

An example of ignoring the problem could be taken from the Greek Insurgency when many young people who defected were placed in jails with hardened Communists who re-recruited them into the insurgent movement; others were placed in camps with inadequate facilities and programs, and becoming bored, went back to the insurgents.¹⁸

¹⁸Tinker, p. 332.

CHAPTER IX

FOLLOWUP

Some system to monitor those who had defected was essential. A large portion of the followup could be accomplished by the Armed Forces of the country in which the defector had joined or was drafted. But in a heterogeneous population (men, women and children) that joined and later defected from an insurgency, a large geographical distribution could be expected. Though accountability was important, the "grievance" aspect so considered, was to insure that the ultimate mission of the defection program was accomplished. To insert the defector back into the mainstream of the life of the country was the goal.

Those who are opposed to defection as a policy are quick to point out that an individual who deserted often returned to the enemy. Examination of the Malaya and Vietnam defection programs indicated that this was not so. In studying this problem, one could say that only a few returned because first, the program was good, or second, that the new life of the defector was too good to give up. Though both of these facts had some bearing, the most important factor was the retaliation by the Communists, or at least the fear of it. In Malaya, the Communist vengeance was very limited. One author feels the low re-defection rate was caused by the nature of the violent break from communism.¹ In the Philippines, the followup was simplified by the relocation of the defectors to an isolated rural area.

¹Mills, p. 65.

At the present time, the followup activity in Vietnam is carried on at a very low key level. It is the responsibility of the District Chieu Hoi cadre to be aware of each defector's location. At the same time, in certain areas, the APTs while on operational missions call on defectors. The mere size of the Vietnam defector population is too great to conduct a close followup, nor at this stage is it really necessary.

It is interesting to note a rather detailed, cross-country followup study was conducted and it revealed that perhaps 2% have returned to the Communists.² This low rate should have come as no surprise since in the inducement phase every effort is made to provide the Communists with knowledge of who rallied, e. g., group pictures on leaflets, tape broadcasts by defectors, as well as quick reaction leaflets. Perhaps this compromising may seem cruel but it fixes the defector in his new way of life. The Communists have indicated and indoctrinated their members on what they think of defectors.

Another criticism of the Vietnam defection program is that such a program is penetrated by the Communists. It should be accepted that at any time a low level penetration of a defector program is to be expected. Good interrogation will help to discover those individuals sent on penetration missions. In Vietnam, there are several cases when individuals who were sent by the Communists on such missions, after finding the program basically good, in turn informed

²Fact Sheet - Chieu Hoi Program, p. 5.

authorities of their enemy tasking--requesting to become true defectors. This underlines the need for the program to honestly represent the "promise."

CHAPTER X

MOTIVATION

The study of the motivation involved in defection is most complex and extends well beyond the limits of this paper. But to assess defection some of this complex subject needs to be addressed. It is interesting to note that certain common aspects of motivation have existed in all cases which were studied. An author in discussing the desertion in the American Civil War, which showed a defection rate of 1 out of 7 on the North and 1 out of 9 on the South, provided the following reasons:¹

- (1) Many of the citizens were without sympathy with the thought of coercion of the south with military forces.
- (2) Hardship of war caused by the shortage of clothing (especially shoes), shortage of food, weather (heat, cold, rain which resulted in mud and dust).
- (3) High disease rate, especially among infantile diseases such as measles, mumps and diarrhea.
- (4) Pay problems which caused excessive solicitude for families back home.
- (5) Lack of qualified field and company officers.
- (6) Absence of realization of the obligation incurred by enlistment and the resulting failure of impressing these obligations on the minds of soldiers.
- (7) As time went on, war weariness and discouragement.
- (8) Poor caliber and method of obtaining recruits.
- (9) Inducement by civilians. (Previously discussed).

¹ Lonn, p. 228.

One author in discussing the elusive "why" of defection of Huks in the Philippines provided the following reasons:²

- (1) Hardship of life in the mountains.
- (2) Failures and disappointments of the Huk Organizations.
- (3) Opportunities offered by the government.
- (4) Family pressures to surrender.

In Malaya, the most authoritative work on the subject of motivation of defection took the approach that the considerations that led the defector to break with communism were closely related to those that initially brought them into the movement and the resultant participation in the "war of liberation."³ A brief summary of the reasons for defection in Malaya are:⁴

- (1) Periods of doubt about communism. The critical phase being the first year and one half.
- (2) Realization that the potential defector was sacrificing himself to a losing cause.
- (3) Realization that the party was corrupt.
- (4) Dissatisfaction among the lower ranks with the gross differences in material advantages that they received in comparison to their leaders.
- (5) Promotion difficulties.
- (6) Hardships and personal suffering.
- (7) Isolation by and within the party.

²Scaff, p. 122.

³Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (1956), p. 324.

⁴Ibid., pp. 324-342.

Considerable study has been conducted in Vietnam, with the purpose of inducing further defection. Probably the best look at motivation provided the following which indicates that the reasons for changing sides were more often to be human rather than ideological conviction. These reasons are:⁵

(1) Disillusionment

(2) Fear. The Viet Cong is subject to fears of many kinds--allied weapons, of never seeing his relatives again, being abandoned on the battlefield, and not having a proper oriental burial.

(3) Harsh discipline and constant surveillance.

(4) Nostalgia. The Vietnamese by custom have close home ties, and changing military conditions no longer permit the guerrilla to live and visit his family. This cause became more important when conditions forced the recruiting by the Viet Cong of younger and younger men, teenagers, women and even very small children. The author recalls one teenager armed with an SKS rifle coming in with his younger sister (strapped to his back) giving the reason for defection was that he could not take care of his sister, his parents having both been killed.

(5) Loss of faith in a Communist victory. This being more important for the seven percent who were ranking military officers or hardcore Communist functionaries.

(6) The unexplainables. There have been over 800 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) defectors and 10% of these were high ranking officers. The NVA defectors must have realized that it was highly unlikely they would ever see their families in the north.

The conditions that cause defection are most interesting but the individuals who defect are even more interesting. It would be hard

⁵JUSPAO, The Chieu Hoi Program in Vietnam, pp. 17-27.

for most people to accept the fact that in the Civil War Sir Henry Morton Stanley (of later African fame) switched sides in 1861, joining the Union Artillery and a short time later for health reasons was discharged, only later to enlist in the Union Navy in 1864.⁶ There are many Stanleys on the roles of defectors.

The political aspects of defection in "wars of liberation" cannot be overlooked. Many of the cadre were political men and had political rationalization for changing sides and at the same time an opportunity to do so with political advantages gained. One author stated: "Changing sides is not disapproved of in Vietnamese culture. On the contrary, proselyting is common and no opprobrium is placed on one who changes sides provided he observes a "decent interval."⁷ Another author provided the insight when he stated: "A man's motives for defecting are inevitably complex and though the defector often cites ideological enlightenment, the baser reasons are fear, fatigue, loneliness, and protracted hardships."⁸ The decision to defect is critical when one realizes the punishment that has been inflicted on those that do by the losing side. The most brutal penalty imposed during the American Civil War was crucifixion.⁹ Those in the military accept the theory that there are no surrenders without military pressure.¹⁰

⁶Dorothy Stanley, The Autobiography of Sir Henry Morton Stanley (1909), pp. 214-220.

⁷Ithiel de Sola Pool, Political Alternatives to the Viet Cong (1967), p. 560.

⁸The Rand Corporation, Political Motivation of the Viet Cong: The Vietminh Regroupes (1968), p. 165.

⁹Lonn, p. 60.

¹⁰Clutterbuck, p. 107.

Thus, motivation for defection in wars of liberation can be generally placed in two categories: long-range factors and short-range. These factors will vary during particular periods of time, but in the end a combination will cause an individual to make the decision. The weight assigned to each of these factors will vary considerably from defector to defector.

CHAPTER XI

THE COMMUNIST USE OF DEFECTION

In the development of an effective organization to conduct a "war of liberation," the Communists are forced to rely heavily on defections. It must be assumed at the initial stage of any insurgency that the population is either proexisting government, or at least, aware of it with no commitment for or against. It should be noted that Mao said:

We seek people who serve us, through greed, through fear, inferiority, vengeance, what have you, but who serve us, serve the party, serve the design of the Comintern, serve the cause of the revolution . . . that is the essence of the Yenan way.¹

The best example of the Communist use of defection as a program was the Binh Van Program in Vietnam. This program was generally considered under the heading of a proselyting program, really just the Communist word for defection. This program had the purpose or goal of destroying the military and governmental structure by nonmilitary means.² The objectives of this program in the descending order of desirability were:

- (1) Induce unit desertions, preferably accompanied by some final act of sabotage.
- (2) Induce military desertion or civilian defection. (Note: the distinction, desertion for military defection for civilian . . . yet the act is the same.)

¹ Eudocio Ravines, The Yenan War (1951), p. 151.

² Douglas Pike, War, Peace and Viet Cong (1969), p. 116.

(3) Induce desertion or defection by individuals or groups without transference of allegiance to the National Liberation Front (NLF).

(4) Induce major and significant opposition within the military or civil service.

There was some similarity in the "promise" phase of the defection program and techniques used by the Communists, but at the same time, there were striking differences. The Communists used certain techniques to put forth the Binh Van Program. These were:

(1) Wide publication of the liberal NLF policy toward recanting military and civil servants.

(2) Heavy reliance on selective terror and intimidation.

(3) Use of penetration agents to develop support within the military and civil service.

(4) Use of family ties and friendships to induce defectors. (In 1964, an intensive letter writing campaign of massive proportions was used.)

(5) Heavy reliance on leaflets. (When the movement became more civilian oriented in 1964, the technique of leaving leaflets in government offices was a common practice.)

(6) Promise of tangible and intangible rewards. (This included cash rewards, financial assistance to resettle a defector in native villages, as well as the use of commendations and citations.)³

Though this program had not been studied in depth, it was obvious that some functional phases of other programs previously discussed were employed. The obvious question was how effective was the program? This was not easy to answer but it was worthy to note that between 1960 and 1963, about 20,000 ARVN military forces did desert; no figures

³Douglas Pike, Viet Cong (1966), pp. 259-268.

were available on the portion who joined the Viet Cong.⁴ One author who studied the program stated: "It would appear that despite the intensive effort mounted, the campaign did not significantly affect the efficiency of the Vietnamese Armed Forces."⁵

The most interesting thing about the program was that in Vietnam we found both sides with a defection program. This will probably be the pattern in "future wars of liberation."

⁴Ibid., p. 267.
⁵Ibid.

CHAPTER XII

THE MILITARY ROLE IN DEFECTION

In examining the defection programs in the Philippines, Malaya, and Vietnam, we found that in the Philippines 9,000 Huks out of a force of 20,000 switched rather than continued to fight.¹ In Malaya, 1173 had defected by the end of 1956.² In Vietnam, over 160,000 took the same route away and many were actively participating on the side of the government of South Vietnam.³ Though numbers were little proof of anything, in a situation where scorekeeping was suspect, it did indicate an existing weakness in Communist insurgent movements. Since communism had been applied in Europe, Asia, and Cuba, it was most obvious and well demonstrated that a certain number of people would flee rather than accept and continue the religion of communism. The motives were difficult to understand, but the facts of defection did exist. If in fact, the future would present us with more "wars of liberation" among the third world countries, what would be the US role? Active military intervention was most remote; advice and assistance seemed most probable. Would this advice and assistance capitalize on "lessons learned?" Or would this major weakness of

¹Ramon Magsaysay, "We Smashed the Communists," US News and World Report, (13 February 1953), p. 30.

²Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (1956), p. 109.

³US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, CORDS, Chieu Hoi Directorate, Weekly Returnee Report for 23-29 August 1970, p. 1.

communism be overlooked? It was established that insurgency as an element of land warfare, and the doctrine of land warfare prevailed in military action to prevent or defeat it. The United States Army had the heaviest role to play in the application of stability operations which were a mixture of military, political, social, psychological, and economic measures used to prevent, suppress, or defeat subversion and insurgency--" . . . particularly Communist Wars of National Liberation."⁴ Having the task, the military representation was normally that of members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Military Groups, or Military Mission in support of the host country.

ABSENCE OF DOCTRINE

The principal manual of doctrine for stability operations, which prescribed general doctrine for the roles, missions and employment of US Army Forces in stability operations did not include "induced defection."⁵ The supporting field manual, Stability Operations Intelligence, which should provide the doctrine for intelligence tactics and techniques for the intelligence phase of stability operations made only one mention of defection. This passing remark said, " . . . to effectively exploit defector supplied information, it must be acted upon quickly, before the insurgent discovers the defection

⁴US Department of the Army, Department of the Army Manual: Role of US Army as an Instrument of National Security (May, 1969), p. 1-6.

⁵US Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-23 w/cl: Stability Operations--US Army Doctrine (December 1967).

and takes countermeasures."⁶ Turning to counterinsurgency doctrine, the official guidance to the commanders and staffs for the training and operational employment of units, teams and individuals designated as counterinsurgency forces, likewise made no mention of defection as a possibility.⁷ Since a considerable volume of information concerning all aspects of guerrilla warfare and insurgent conditions had been published by a host of qualified military and civilian authors by commercial publishers, the author conducted a comprehensive study of this material. The review revealed that only one such commercial book had any in-depth treatment of "induced defection" and this was a little over five pages in length.⁸ It is most ironic that these five pages were a verbatim account found in a 1966 report of the Center for Research in Social Systems of the American University, which produced this study while operating under contract with the Department of the Army.⁹

WHY

The author, whose initial research in this area was intended as a critique of the status of acceptance and the development of the future potential of implementation of this strategy, offers the

⁶US Department of the Army, Field Manual 30-31: Stability Operations-Intelligence (January, 1970), p. 7-7.

⁷US Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-22A: US Army Counterinsurgency Forces (November, 1963).

⁸Tinker, pp. 329-334.

⁹Andrew R. Molnar, et. al., Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (1966), pp. 287-292.

following explanations on the dearth or lack of acceptance of this weapon against communism. The following reasons were based on personal observations, conversations, and research:

(1) The military dislike for defection. Defectors are guilty of treason, thus are traitors who can only be considered with contempt. This is not limited to the United States Army. Recently, the United States Coast Guard refused to accept a Lithuanian sailor as a defector from a Soviet fishing boat.¹⁰

(2) Only military force can cause an individual to defect, and in the heat of battle, with or without a safe conduct pass, the defectors must be considered as prisoners of war.

(3) The absence of active participation on the part of military personnel in the most recent defection program in Vietnam. The Vietnam program was administered by civilians, and the advisory effort was largely contract Philippine personnel. (It should be noted that these people did an outstanding job.)

(4) The false assumption that defection is the responsibility of the intelligence community. The intelligence community is only interested in the "cream" and has no desire, nor really the ability to develop the "dairy herd."

(5) The absence of favorable publicity on how effective defection programs really are. Ironically, each author in discussing the Philippines or Malaya will make the remark something like this " . . . defection programs have played a vital and significant role in the successful outcomes . . . "

(6) A proper program cuts across so many areas of interest, (i. e., personnel, intelligence, logistics, psychological warfare and diplomatic areas) no one feels the primary responsibility.

¹⁰"Simas Kudirka Leaped and Desperation Spread," The National Observer, 7 December 1970, p. 1.

(7) The costs of such a program retard interest. In fact, the program in Vietnam is inexpensive. In 1966, with 20,000 defectors the cost averaged \$150.00 per defector. It must be noted that these costs can vary because of facility requirements and enemy damage.¹¹

(8) Mistaken opinions, e. g.: defector camps were "enemy rest areas;" or most defectors go back to the enemy. (The author discovered only one antidefection article. This article addressed the fact that the program in Vietnam was declining because of "corruption." The source of the article was considered by the author and dismissed.)¹²

THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE

The real problem was explained by two authors who surveyed Army doctrine when they reported: "The US Army does not now have the capability to function in the political struggle either in a direct or advisory capacity. There is no general doctrine on how to control people . . . the US Army can participate in the political aspects of insurgency if doctrine is developed and a body of experts in the application of this doctrine is formed."¹³

¹¹US Military Assistance Command Vietnam, CORDS, MACCORDS Briefing The Chieu Hoi Program (1967), p. 5.

¹²Donald Duncan, "Open Arms, Closed Minds," Ramparts, (24 August 1968), pp. 6-8.

¹³William J. Buchanan, et. al, "Capitalizing on Guerrilla Vulnerabilities," Military Review, Vol. 48, August 1968, p. 3.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCLUSIONS

At present, though induced defection can be identified as a weakness of the Communists in "wars of liberation," the United States does not have the following: policy, supporting doctrine or techniques, fixed responsibility, or general acceptance.

Defection is not a new phenomenon, nor is it one that is foreign to the United States. Defection played important roles in the American Revolutionary War and the American Civil War; and it also was effective against communism in the Philippines, Malaya, and Vietnam. The loss of forces to the opposing side has existed and will continue to exist. The sharp division between freedom and communism lends itself to induced defection. Communists have realized that defection is a continuous danger against world expansion. Unfortunately, with the favorable historical data available, the United States has not developed a supporting military strategy to capitalize on the potential of defection. A similarity exists in all defection programs, especially in the functional phases. Reticence on the part of the military to engage in, promote, and support defection programs has resulted in an absence of policy, doctrine, and general knowledge of the subject.

In order to reap such a "harvest" in future wars of liberation, the need exists to develop defection as a strategy against communism. The military role is not well defined and it is necessary that the host government play a major role. The complexity of planning and

conducting defection programs along with the functional phases of defection, cuts across many activities--to fix responsibility will be difficult. In addition, political aspects of defection further complicates the matter.

History, according to Arthur Schopenhauer, " . . . shows us the life of nations, has nothing to record save wars and revolution; the peaceful years appear as brief pauses or interludes scattered here and there."¹ It would be most plausible to make use of these pauses or interludes.

¹H. L. Mencken, A New Dictionary of Quotations (1942), p. 536.

CHAPTER XIV

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) As insurgency is an element of land warfare and the doctrine of land warfare prevails in actions to prevent or defeat an insurgency, the Department of the Army develop policy and doctrine in the field of induced defection.

(2) Since stability operations are a part of the total internal defense and internal development programs, all involved agencies of the United States develop supporting efforts.

(3) A complete, objective "After Action" report of the Vietnam experience in defection be prepared. This report should concentrate on strengths, weaknesses, and lessons learned from the Vietnam defection program.

(4) The curriculum of advanced military institutions include defection as part of the program, if only historical aspects.

(5) Orientation courses for members assigned to Military Advisory Groups (excluding Vietnam), Military Groups, or Military Missions be made aware of the potential of defection.

(6) In countries where the sparks of "wars of liberation" have been kindled, a member (determined by the Ambassador) of the "Country Team" address the potential of defection to the host government.

(7) The US Army review and address the problem of induced defection as a counterstrategy in all doctrine concerning stability operations and counterinsurgency.


EMMETT J. O'BRIEN
COL, MI

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